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The War Powers Resolution at
40: Still an Unconstitutional,
Unnecessary, and Unwise Fraud
That Contributed Directly to
the 9/11 Attacks
Robert F. Turner, SJD *
The 1973 War Powers Resolution was a fraud upon the
American people, portrayed as a legislative fix to the problem of
“imperial presidents” taking America to war in Korea and
Vietnam without public approval or the constitutionally required
legislative sanction. By its own terms, the War Powers
Resolution would not have stopped the Vietnam War. Sadly, this
and other legislative intrusions upon the constitutional authority
of the president contributed to the loss of millions of lives in
places like Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, and Central
America. The statute played a clear role in encouraging the
terrorist attack that killed 241 Marines in 1983, and equally
clearly encouraged Osama bin Laden to kill thousands of
Americans on September 11, 2001. Similarly unconstitutional
usurpations of presidential power prevented our Intelligence
Community from preventing those attacks and dissuaded a key
ally from sharing sensitive information that might also have
prevented them. After forty years, the time has come to bring
an end to this congressional lawbreaking.
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I. Introduction
More than forty-six years have passed since I first became
interested in the constitutional separation of foreign affairs powers
while listening to a lecture by the legendary University of Chicago
scholar Professor Quincy Wright. 1 At the time I was working on my
undergraduate honors thesis on the war in Indochina, and following
graduation I was commissioned in the Army and served twice in the
Republic of Vietnam. After leaving the Army at the end of 1971 as a
junior Captain, I accepted a fellowship at Stanford’s Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution and Peace where I continued my work
on the war and authored the first major English-language history of
Vietnamese Communism. 2
The War Powers Resolution was enacted over President Nixon’s
veto on November 7, 1973, as a response to the Vietnam War. 3 Just
over a month later, my Hoover Institution fellowship landed me in the
office of Assistant Senate Minority Leader Robert P. Griffin, of
Michigan, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Soon
thereafter, the Senator hired me off of the fellowship and for five years
I served as his national security adviser, dealing directly with every
war powers issue addressed in the Senate during that period. In 1981,
while serving as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, I wrote an eighty-page memorandum on the modern utility
of formal declarations of war. 4 Later, while I was an attorney in the
White House, I frequently briefed members of Congress (including, at
the time, such largely unknown figures as Representative Newt
Gingrich and Senator Dan Quayle) about the 1973 statute at the
request of the National Security Adviser. I worked on war powers
issues again in 1984–198585 while serving as Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs.
As a scholar, I’ve published two books 5 specifically about the War
Powers Resolution and testified repeatedly in both the House and
1.

Among his many other achievements, Professor Wright served as
President of the American and International Political Science
Associations and of the American Society of International Law. His 1922
volume, The Control of American Foreign Relations, remains a classic
in the field.

2.

ROBERT F. TURNER, VIETNAMESE COMMUNISM: ITS ORIGINS
DEVELOPMENTS (1975).

3.

H.R.J. Res. 542, Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548).

4.

Memorandum from Robert F. Turner on Utility of Declaration of War
(Dec. 9, 1981), available at http://www.virginia.edu/cnsl/pdf/Turner
1981WarMemo.pdf.

5.

ROBERT F. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS
IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1983); ROBERT F. TURNER,
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Senate on the statute. My 1,700-page SJD (academic law doctorate)
dissertation dealt heavily with war powers issues, and over nearly a
quarter-of-a-century I’ve taught courses and seminars dealing with
constitutional war powers at the undergraduate and post-graduate
level at the University of Virginia, where in 1981 I co-founded the
Center for National Security Law.
All of that is to emphasize that these are not new issues to me.
And while I like to think that my views have evolved and become
perhaps a bit more sophisticated over the decades, my basic
conclusions have not changed since 1973—irrespective of which
political party has occupied the White House. Put simply, I believe
the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional, unnecessary, and
unwise. This is not merely a theoretical problem, because in my view
that statute has done tremendous harm to U.S. national security and
the cause of world peace—including playing a key role in persuading
Osama bin Laden to launch the 9/11 attacks that killed nearly 3,000
innocent Americans and precipitated conflicts that claimed hundreds
of thousands of lives and depleted our treasury by more than one
trillion dollars. 6
My time is limited, but let me at least summarize my concerns.

II. The War Powers Resolution Is Unconstitutional
To understand the separation of constitutional powers regarding
“war” and the use of military force, we need first of all to appreciate
the importance of Article II, Section 1, which grants to “a President
of the United States” the nation’s “executive Power.” 7 Today,
Americans read that clause and assume it conveys merely the power
to “execute” the laws and policies established by Congress. But that
was not the understanding of the men who wrote the Constitution
during the summer of 1787. They understood “executive power” as
the term was used by Locke, 8 Montesquieu, 9 and Blackstone10—whose

REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF
LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1991) [hereinafter TURNER, REPEALING
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION].
6.

See, e.g., AMY BELASCO, CONG.
OF IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND
OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11 (2011).

RESEARCH SERV., RL 33110, THE COST
OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

7.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.

8.

See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ¶¶ 146–47 (1690).

9.

See 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT
Nugent trans., 1900).

10.

See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
245 (1765).
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writings were often referred to as the “political bibles” 11 of the
Framers. Each of these writers viewed what Locke described as the
business of “war, peace, leagues and alliances” 12 to be the province of
the king, prince, or magistrate—the “executive” officer of the
government.
How do we know the Founding Fathers embraced this view?
Because they repeatedly told us so in clear terms. Writing in June
1789, Representative James Madison explained: “[T]he Executive
power being in general terms vested in the President, all powers of an
Executive nature, not particularly taken away must belong to that
department. . . .” 13 The following year, Madison’s friend and mentor
Thomas Jefferson wrote in a memorandum to President Washington:
The Constitution . . . has declared that “the Executive power
shall be vested in the President,” submitting only special
articles of it to a negative by the Senate. . . .
The transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive
altogether; it belongs, then to the head of that department,
except as to such portions of it as are specially submitted to the
Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly. 14

Those “[e]xceptions” included the Senate’s negatives on treaties
and diplomatic appointments, as well as the power of Congress to
“declare War.” 15 President Washington discussed Jefferson’s
memorandum with Chief Justice John Jay and Representative
Madison, recording in his diary three days later that both agreed with
Jefferson that, beyond these enumerated exceptions, the Senate had
“no Constitutional right to interfere” in the business of diplomacy,
“all the rest being Executive and vested in the President by the
Constitution.” 16
Jefferson’s chief rival in Washington’s cabinet, Treasury Secretary
Alexander Hamilton, took an identical position in 1793:
The general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the
Executive Power of the Nation is vested in the President;

11.

See, e.g., QUINCY WRIGHT, CONTROL
263 (1922).

12.

LOCKE, supra note 8, ¶ 146.

13.

James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, June 21, 1789, in 5 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 405–06 (1904).

14.

16 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 378–79 (Julian P. Boyd, ed. 1961)
(emphasis added).

15.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.

16.

IV DIARIES OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 1748–1799, at 128 (1925).
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subject only to the exceptions and qualifications which are
expressed in the instrument. . . .
It deserves to be remarked, that as the participation of the
Senate in the making of treaties, and the power of the
Legislature to declare war, are exceptions out of the general
“Executive Power” vested in the President, they are to be
construed strictly—and ought to be extended no further than is
essential to their execution. 17

Yet another key Jefferson rival, Chief Justice John Marshall,
reaffirmed the president’s independent constitutional responsibilities
in the field of foreign affairs in perhaps the most famous of all
Supreme Court decisions, Marbury v. Madison, when he wrote:
By the constitution of the United States, the President is
invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise
of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only
to his country in his political character, and to his own
conscience . . . .
[W]hatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which
executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can
exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are
political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and
being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is
conclusive. 18

Marshall illustrated this principle by mentioning the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs (later retitled Secretary of State) and declaring that
the acts of that officer “can never be examinable by the courts.” 19 As
Professor Wright observed in 1922, “when the constitutional
convention gave ‘executive power’ to the President, the foreign
relations power was the essential element in the grant. . . .” 20
In addition to understanding the vast grant of “executive Power”
to the president with respect to foreign affairs, we must also recognize
that the Constitutional Framers intentionally limited the authority of
17.

XV THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 39, 42 (Harold C. Syrett ed.,
1969) (emphasis altered).

18.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803).

19.

Id. at 166.

20.

WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 147. In his 1972 classic, Foreign Affairs and
the Constitution, Columbia Law School Professor Louis Henkin
observed: “The executive power . . . was not defined because it was well
understood by the Framers raised on Locke, Montesquieu and
Blackstone.” LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
43 (1972).
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the legislature over the business of war. In the original draft, Congress
was empowered “to make War”—giving it essentially all powers
related to war beyond the actual command of troops, as had been the
case under the Articles of Confederation. 21 But on August 17, 1787,
James Madison moved to amend the language to give Congress only
the power “to declare war.” 22 After Rufus King observed that “make”
war might give Congress some role in the conduct of war, which was
“an executive function,” the vote of Connecticut was changed to ay
and Madison’s motion prevailed with but a single negative vote.23
Soon thereafter, a motion to involve Congress in decisions to conclude
wars (“to give the Legislature power of peace”) was unanimously
rejected. 24
The concept of a “declaration of war” was a term of art from the
law of nations, and such instruments were only considered necessary
when a nation was about to launch an all-out “aggressive” attack
against a nation with which it was at peace. The Framers understood
the concepts of “perfect” and “imperfect” war, and also of force short
of war. 25
Throughout our history, Congress has formally “declared war”
eleven times involving five wars. 26 But as the Supreme Court noted in
21.

See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1 (“The United
States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and
power of determining on peace and war. . . .”).

22.

2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
ed., 2d ed. 1937).

23.

See id. at 319.

24.

See id.

25.

As Justice Washington noted in the 1800 case of Bas v. Tingy:

OF

1787, at 318 (Max Farrand

It may, I believe, be safely laid down, that every contention by
force between two nations, in external matters, under the
authority of their respective governments, is not only war, but
public war. If it be declared in form, it is called solemn, and is
of the perfect kind; because one whole nation is at war with
another whole nation; and all the members of the nation
declaring war, are authorised to commit hostilities against all
the members of the other, in every place, and under every
circumstance . . . .
But hostilities may subsist between two nations more confined
in its nature and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and
things; and this is more properly termed imperfect war . . . .
Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 40–41 (1800) (emphasis added).
26.

In addition to the War of 1812, The Mexican-American War, and the
Spanish-American War, Congress declared war against Germany and
Austria-Hungary during World War I and against Japan, Germany,
Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania during World War II.
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Verdugo-Urquidez, “The United States frequently employs Armed
Forces outside this country—over 200 times in our history—for the
protection of American citizens or national security.” 27 To mention
one early example, President Thomas Jefferson ordered two-thirds of
the new American Navy to sail for the Mediterranean in March 1801
with orders to protect our commerce and sink and burn the ships of
any Barbary States that they should learn had declared war on
America, without even formally informing Congress until his
December 8, 1801, State of the Union report—and the Annals of
Congress reveal no expression of concern that the president should
first have obtained prior legislative sanction. 28
The great publicists in international law, like Hugo Grotius and
Emmerich de Vattel, noted that formal declarations of war were not
necessary when a nation was, as Grotius put it, “repelling an invasion,
or seeking to punish the actual author of some crime.” 29 Vattel added
that “[h]e who is attacked and only wages defensive war, needs not to
make any hostile declaration. . . .” 30 Other scholars made similar
statements. 31
Many things have changed in the 225 years since the Constitution
was drafted, and some of the powers vested in Congress have little
contemporary relevance. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the
Constitution vests in Congress the powers to “declare War, [and]
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” 32 but I would submit that
both are now anachronisms. The use of “Letters of Marque and
Reprisal” 33 was outlawed by the 1856 Declaration of Paris,34 and they
27.

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990).

28.

For information on this operation, see Robert F. Turner, President
Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates, in PIRACY AND MARITIME
CRIME: HISTORICAL AND MODERN CASE STUDIES 157, 162−63 (Bruce A.
Elleman et al. eds. 2010).

29.

HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW
trans., 1949).

30.

EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND
SOVEREIGNS 316 (Joseph Chitty ed., 7th ed. 1849).

31.

See Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause
of the Constitution 34 VA. J.INT’L L. 903, 906−10 (1994) (discussing
how international scholars, such as Franciscus de Victoria, Alberico
Gentili, Richard Zouche, Samuel von Pufendorf, Cornelius Van
Bynkershoek, Christian Wolff, Jean Jacques Burlamqui, and James
Kent, have interpreted the power and obligation to declare war).

32.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.

33.

Letters
capture
used by
of 1812.

OF

WAR

AND

PEACE 289 (Louise R. Loomis,

of Marque and Reprisal authorized private ship owners to
ships belonging to an enemy or its subjects and were widely
the United States during the Revolutionary War and the War
It has been suggested that this clause gives Congress a negative
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have not been granted by the United States since the War of 1812.
Similarly, the types of all-out “offensive” (i.e., “aggressive”) wars
historically associated with formal declarations of war were outlawed
in principle by the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Treaty 35 and again by the UN
Charter in 1945. 36 No country in the world has issued a declaration of
war in more than 65 years.
However, this is not to suggest that the UN Charter or the
Declaration of Paris have altered our Constitution in any manner. If
an American president concluded that it was useful to launch an
aggressive “perfect” war, or to authorize private ship owners to use
armed force against the ships of nationals of a foreign nation on the
high seas, then Congress would certainly still retain its negative over
either action. But if the United States respects its treaty
commitments and the rule of law, such behavior will not occur and
the once important powers of Congress to declare war and grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal will not come into play.
Does this mean that Congress no longer has any role in the
business of war? It does not. To the contrary, the Commander-inChief Power by itself is totally conditional upon prior legislative
action. The president has no “army” or “navy” to command until
they are raised or provided by statute,37 and no money is available to
pay salaries or purchase weapons or other supplies without
“Appropriations made by Law. . . .” 38 No major prolonged military
engagement is likely to prevail without additional funds and forces
from Congress, and even without a constitutional need for a
declaration of war, presidents usually and wisely seek some sort of
legislative sanction before committing U.S. forces to major combat
activities. Since World War II, this has often been done by joint
over uses of force short of war, but that position is not sound. See
Robert F. Turner, Covert War and the Constitution: A Response, 5 J.
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 409, 415−19 (2012).
34.

See Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, LXI B.S.P.
155, 155˗58.

35.

Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27,
1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (1928).

36.

See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).

37.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12–13.

38.

Id. art. 1, § 9 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall
be published from time to time.”).
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resolutions 39 (the same legislative instrument historically used to
declare war) styled in more recent years as “Authorizations for the
Use of Military Force” or “AUMFs.” 40
Congress has every right to refuse to approve requested
appropriations for forces or supplies, and thus can indirectly
undermine virtually any major commitment of U.S. military forces
into hostilities. But a “narrowly construed” 41 power to “declare War”
does not carry with it legislative authority to prevent the president
from using whatever military Congress creates to safeguard the
national against both foreign threats and acts of aggression, or to see
the laws (including the UN Charter) “faithfully executed.” 42
Put simply, the power “to declare War” does not equate to the
power to limit “the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances” 43 as asserted in
the War Powers Resolution. Particularly outrageous is Section 2(c)(3)
of that statute, which pretends to limit the president’s constitutional
power to protect American civilians abroad or on the high seas.
Section 2(c) reads:
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commanderin-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are
exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific
statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by
39.

For the texts and associated citations of various declarations of war and
AUMFs, see NATIONAL SECURITY LAW DOCUMENTS 867–97 (John Norton
Moore, Guy B. Roberts & Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 2006).

40.

See, e.g., id. at 888–97. For useful background on declarations of war
and AUMFs, see generally JENNIFER K. ELSEA & RICHARD F. GRIMMETT,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31133, DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND
AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (2007).

41.

See supra text accompanying notes 13–17.

42.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] . . . shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”). That this was intended to empower
the President to enforce the nation’s treaty obligations is apparent both
from statements by Hamilton and John Marshall. For example, in his
first Pacificus essay, Hamilton wrote: “The President is the
constitutional EXECUTOR of the laws. Our Treaties and the laws of
Nations form a part of the law of the land. He who is to execute the
laws must first judge for himself of their meaning.” HAMILTON, supra
note 17, at 43. See also the 1800 statement by Representative John
Marshall quoted infra text accompanying note 76.

43.

H.R.J. Res. 542, Pub. L. 93-148, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at
50 U.S.C. 1541(a)).
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attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or
its armed forces. 44

In a December 1984 debate with Senator Jacob Javits—the
principal sponsor of the War Powers Resolution—before the American
Branch of the International Law Association, I noted that the
exclusion of civilians from the final clause of this provision was clearly
unconstitutional. To my surprise, during his rebuttal the Senator
conceded the point, explaining that the Senate had tried to get the
House to include a reference to civilians in this clause but had failed.
(Put differently, after failing to get House approval, the Senators
voted for legislation they understood infringed upon the constitutional
powers of the president, despite their oath of office to “support” the
Constitution. 45)
Another highly respected liberal member of the Senate, who
would go on to serve as Majority Leader and receive the Nobel Peace
Prize, also recognized both the statute’s constitutional infirmities and
its practical effect of undermining U.S. national security. During a
1988 Senate floor colloquy in which he, Senator Bobby Byrd, Senator
Sam Nunn, and Senate Armed Services Committee chairman John
Warner took turns criticizing the 1973 statute, Senator George
Mitchell explained:
[T]he War Powers resolution does not work, because
the constitutional bounds on Congress’ power to
Armed Forces in situations short of war and
potentially undermines our ability to effectively
national interests.

it oversteps
control the
because it
defend our

By enabling Congress to require—by its own inaction—the
withdrawal of troops from a situation of hostilities, the
resolution unduly restricts the authority granted by the
Constitution to the President as Commander in Chief. . . .
Although portrayed as an effort “to fulfill—not to alter, amend
or adjust—the intent of the framers of the U.S. Constitution,”
the War Powers Resolution actually expands Congress’
authority beyond the power to declare war to the power to limit
troop deployment in situations short of war. . . .
The War Powers Resolution therefore threatens not only the
delicate balance of power established by the Constitution. It

44.

Id. § 2(c)(3).

45.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
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potentially undermines America’s ability to effectively defend
our national security. 46

On February 29, 1996, it was my honor to take part in a debate
on Capitol Hill under the sponsorship of the Center for National
Security Law on the proposition that the War Powers Resolution
should be repealed. I was paired in the affirmative with the late House
Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde, and our opponents were
former House Foreign Affairs and Intelligence committees chairman
Lee Hamilton and Dr. Louis Fisher of the Library of Congress. As the
debate unfolded, I was pleasantly shocked to hear that neither
Representative Hamilton nor my old friend Lou Fisher was willing to
actually defend the War Powers Resolution. Shortly thereafter, Lou
co-authored an article calling for the statute’s repeal, 47 and in 2008
Representative Hamilton served on the bipartisan National War
Powers Commission, which unanimously concluded that the War
Powers Resolution was unconstitutional and should be repealed. 48

III. The War Powers Resolution is Unnecessary
There is a popular belief today that the 1973 War Powers
Resolution was made necessary by “imperial” 49 presidents who
dragged the nation kicking and screaming into unpopular wars in
Korea and Vietnam against the will of Congress and the American
people. But both charges are patently false. As I have discussed
elsewhere, 50 when the Korean War broke out in June of 1950
President Truman could not have played it more by the book. He
instructed the Department of State to draft an AUMF for Congress to
consider and repeatedly asked to address a joint session of Congress.
He personally met with the joint congressional leadership twice during
the week following the invasion of South Korea, and he spoke
separately with Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Tom
Connally (who had helped draft the UN Charter) and Senate Majority
Leader Scott Lucas—and both assured him that he had authority to
act without legislative sanction and urged him to “stay away” from
46.

See 134 CONG. REC. S6177–78 (daily ed. May 19, 1988) (statement of
Sen. George Mitchell).

47.

Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolution: Time to
Say Goodbye, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 1 (1998).

48.

NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION REPORT 23, 30 (2008). This
document and other materials about the National War Powers
Commission can be found on the web at http://millercenter.org/
policy/commissions/warpowers.

49.

See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENT viii (1973).

50.

Robert F. Turner, Truman, Korea, and the Constitution, 19 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 533, 541, 565–67 (1996).
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Congress. So Truman agreed not to push for an AUMF. But
statements by legislators and public opinion polls confirmed that
sending U.S. troops to fight in Korea initially had strong bipartisan
support in Congress and among the American people. 51
In 1955, the Senate consented to the ratification of the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty, creating the South East Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO), with but a single dissenting vote—
committing the United States to come to the defense of South
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The commitment was reaffirmed by a
joint resolution (statute) in August 1964 that declared:
The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to
world peace the maintenance of international peace and security
in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the
United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in
accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore,
prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary
steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. 52

If there was any doubt about whether Congress was authorizing
the president to take the nation to war by that statute, it should have
been dispelled both by the clear and unambiguous language of the
statute and by this exchange between the majority and minority floor
leaders in the debate, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
J. William Fulbright and Ranking Republican John Sherman Cooper:

51.

For a more detailed discussion of President Truman’s efforts to gain
legislative sanction for the Korean War, see id.

52.

Southeast Asian Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88–508, § 2, 78 Stat. 384
(1964) (emphasis added); repealed by Pub. L. 91-672 § 12 (1971). This
resolution is often referred to as the “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,” but
was clearly addressing a history of North Vietnamese aggression that
preceded the relatively minor incident on August 2, 1964, that North
Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap later admitted to former U.S.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara did occur. See, e.g., David K.
Shipler, Robert McNamara and the Ghosts of Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Aug. 10, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/10/magazine/
robert-mcnamara-and-the-ghosts-of-vietnam.html?pagewanted=
all&src=pm. Since the war ended, Hanoi has admitted that its leaders
made a decision on May 19, 1959 to “liberate” South Vietnam by armed
force and began building the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and
Cambodia to send troops and supplies into South Vietnam for that
purpose. See, e.g., The Legendary Ho Chi Minh Trail, VIETNAM
COURIER (Hanoi), May 1984, at 9.
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Mr. COOPER. Then, looking ahead, if the President decided
that it was necessary to use such force as could lead into war,
we will give that authority by this resolution?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is the way I would interpret it. 53

The Vietnam War (or, more correctly, the Indochina War 54) was
not in the slightest sense a “presidential war” that lacked the support
of Congress or the American people. True, like all American wars, the
commander-in-chief and his military subordinates were solely
responsible for its conduct. 55 But Congress formally authorized “the
use of armed force” by a combined vote of 504 to 2, a 99.6% majority,
and appropriated funds for several years by overwhelming
majorities. 56 As for public support, during the month surrounding
53.

110 CONG. REC. 18,049 (1964) (emphasis added).

54.

The operative language of the Southeast Asian Resolution did not even
mention “The Republic of Vietnam” or “South Vietnam” (as it was
more colloquially known), but rather authorized the President to use
armed force to defend the “Protocol States” of the SEATO treaty—
which were Laos, Cambodia, and [South] Vietnam. This reality was
ignored (presumably out of ignorance) by those who protested as illegal
President Nixon’s decision to send U.S. troops into Cambodia in 1970.
As someone who was in Vietnam at the time (and the following year as
well), I can confirm that the operation was a tremendous military
victory for the South Vietnamese and American forces, and for all
practical purposes broke the back of the Viet Cong in the populated
areas of the Mekong Delta.

55.

Writing for the plurality in Ex parte Milligan, Chief Justice Chase
observed “neither can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude
upon the proper authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper
authority of the President. Both are servants of the people, whose will is
expressed in the fundamental law. Congress cannot direct the conduct of
campaigns. . . .” 71 U.S. 2, 88 (1866) (emphasis added). My old friend
Dr. Louis Fisher used to downplay this language on the basis of it being
but a plurality opinion, but the language was subsequently quoted with
approval by Justice Stevens writing for the Court majority in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591–92 (2006).

56.

If anything, the record shows that Congress dragged President Johnson
into the war. Rather than approving his request for $125 million for
Vietnam when LBJ submitted the 1964 Southeast Asia Resolution,
Congress on its own initiative provided $400 million. Eight months
later, Congress provided another $700 million for the war by a vote of
408 to 7 in the House and 88 to 3 in the Senate. In 1966, a $13 billion
supplemental appropriation for Vietnam cleared the House 389 to 3 and
the Senate 87 to 2. And in 1967, when hundreds of thousands of
American soldiers were clearly involved in a serious war in Vietnam, a
$12 billion Vietnam supplemental appropriation passed the House 385 to
11 and the Senate 77 to 3 (a combined margin of greater than 30 to 1).
ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 21 (1991).

121

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
The War Powers Resolution at 40

LBJ’s air attacks against North Vietnamese bases and enactment of
the Southeast Asia Resolution, LBJ’s approval rating in the Gallup
Polls increased from 42% to 72%—an unprecedented 58% jump in a
single month—and the Gallup organization attributed the rise to
LBJ’s strong stand in Vietnam. 57 Professor John E. Mueller observed
that “support for the war in Vietnam rose very considerably as
American troops joined the fighting during the last half of 1965,”
when polls revealed that supporters of the war outnumbered
opponents by a margin of greater than three-to-one. 58
In March 1966, Senator Wayne Morse (D-Oregon)—one of the
two members of the Senate to vote against the Southeast Asia
Resolution (both of whom were defeated in their next reelection
bids)—introduced a resolution that would have repealed the 1964
statute authorizing the war. Speaking in opposition to the Morse
Amendment (which was tabled by a large majority vote), Senator
Jacob Javits (R-New York) declared: “It is a fact, whether we like it
or not, that by virtue of having acted on the resolution of August
1964, we are a party to present policy.” 59 Later that same year, when
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association approved a
lengthy legal memorandum drafted by my friend and colleague,
Professor John Norton Moore (with whom I co-founded the Center for
National Security Law at the University of Virginia School of Law
more than three decades ago) declaring the war to be lawful under
international and U.S. constitutional law, Senator Javits inserted a
lengthy excerpt from the memo in the Congressional Record and
declared:
Mr. President, now, for the first time, we have an authoritative
analysis of the legal basis for U.S. assistance to the Republic of
Vietnam. In my own thinking there can no longer be any doubt
about the legality of our assistance to the people of South
Vietnam in view of the report to be distributed today by the
American Bar Association. . . . I have never doubted the
lawfulness of the U.S. assistance to the Republic of Vietnam.
Today, it is my privilege to present to the Senate and the
American people a document, which, I believe, supports this
proposition beyond any reasonable doubt. 60

At the time, the American people strongly supported the war.
Seven years later, public opinion had shifted and Senator Javits went
57.

ALBERT H. CANTRIL, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, VIET-NAM,
PRESIDENCY 2–3 (1970).

58.

JOHN E. MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 53–54 (1973).

59.

112 CONG. REC. 4,374 (1966) (emphasis added).

60.

Id. at 13,870.
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with the flow. He introduced the War Powers Resolution, explaining
that it was designed to prevent “future Vietnams” and declared on
the Senate floor:
The War Powers Act would assure that any future decision to
commit the United States to any warmaking must be shared in
by the Congress to be lawful. . . .
By enumerating the war powers of Congress so explicitly and
extensively in article I, section 8, the framers of the
Constitution took special care to assure the Congress of a
concurring role in any measures that would commit the nation
to war. Modern practice, culminating [in] the Vietnam war . . .
has upset the balance of the Constitution in this respect. 61

Put simply, the War Powers Resolution was a fraud upon the
American people. Voters were angry about the unpopular war, and
members of Congress found it in their interest to misrepresent the
facts and pretend that they (and their predecessors a decade earlier)
had nothing to do with sending U.S. forces to fight and die in what
by 1972 was widely seen as an unwinnable quagmire without clear
purpose. (The fact that the military war had largely been won 62 by
that point was irrelevant—it was the public perceptions that would
influence the next elections.) In fairness, by 1973 some of the more
junior legislators may have honestly believed that version of history,
but Senator Jacob Javits—one of the most intelligent members of the
Senate—clearly knew better.
Indeed, the irrelevance of the War Powers Resolution to the
conflict in Indochina is apparent by a simple reading of Section 2 of
the statute (quoted above 63), which recognizes the president’s legal
authority to commit U.S. armed forces to hostilities pursuant to
“specific statutory authorization. . . .” That’s precisely what the 1964
Southeast Asia Resolution was. Put simply, had the War Powers
61.

119 CONG. REC. 1,394 (1973).

62.

As Yale History Professor John Lewis Gaddis (often described as the
Dean of American Diplomatic Historians) observed writing in Foreign
Affairs in 2005, “Historians now acknowledge that American
counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam were succeeding during the
final years of that conflict; the problem was that support for the war
had long since crumbled at home.” John Lewis Gaddis, Grand Strategy
in the Second Term, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.—Feb. 2005, at 2, 9. As
someone who studied the war at the time and made frequent trips to
Vietnam between 1968 and the 1975 evacuation (I was the last
congressional staff member to be evacuated), I strongly agree with
Professor Gaddis’ assessment, as did most of my colleagues who followed
the war closely at the time.

63.

See supra text accompanying notes 43–44.
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Resolution been in force in 1964, it would have had zero impact upon
the decision to commit U.S. armed forces to war in Indochina.
Before concluding this section of my paper, it may be useful to
address the constitutional role of Congress in the event of a UN
Security Council decision to authorize the use of armed force pursuant
to Chapter VII of the Charter. 64 On the eve of Operation Desert
Storm, I was a witness before the Senate Judiciary Committee when a
discussion arose about possibly impeaching President George H. W.
Bush if he sought to implement Security Council Resolution 678 65 and
resist Saddam Hussein’s brutal aggression without first getting an
AUMF from Congress. (What a useful signal to send to our enemies
at a time when the world community had united in an effort to deter
continued international aggression.) President Obama’s 2011 decision
to use U.S. armed force in and over the territory of Libya pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1973 66 raised similar questions.
One thing is clear. The Senators who in 1945 consented to the
ratification of the UN Charter, and the members of both chambers of
Congress who overwhelmingly approved the U.N. Participation Act
(UNPA) 67 later that year, did not envision a role for Congress in the
authorization of U.S. combat operations to enforce a Chapter VII
decision of the Security Council.
Indeed, the unanimous report of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee recommending consenting to ratification of the Charter—
in language later quoted with approval by the unanimous report of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the UNPA—declared:
Preventative or enforcement action by these [U.S.] forces upon
the order of the Security Council would not be an act of war
but would be international action for the preservation of the
peace and for the purpose of preventing war. Consequently, the
provisions of the Charter do not affect the exclusive power of
the Congress to declare war.
The committee feels that a reservation or other congressional
action . . . would also violate the spirit of the United States
Constitution under which the President has well-established
powers and obligations to use our armed forces without specific
approval of Congress. 68
64.

U.N. CHARTER arts. 39–51 (providing the authority of the Security
Council to authorize the use of military force and related matters).

65.

S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0678 (Nov. 29, 1990).

66.

S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).

67.

United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1946).

68.

Turner, Truman, Korea and the Constitution, supra note 50, at 551
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 79-1383, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7–8 (1945)).
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The House Foreign Affairs Committee’s UNPA report also
explained:
The basic decision of the Senate in advising and consenting to
ratification of the Charter resulted in the undertaking by this
country of various obligations which will actually [be] carried
out by and under the authority of the President as the Chief
Executive, diplomatic, and military officer of the Government.
Among such obligations is that of supplying armed forces to the
Security Council concerning which provision is made in section
6. . . .
[T]he ratification of the Charter resulted in the vesting in the
executive branch of the power and obligation to fulfill the
commitments assumed by the United States thereunder. . . . 69

Under the Constitution, the president is empowered and charged
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. . . .” 70 Under the
Supremacy Clause, “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . . . .” 71 Thus, treaties are a part of the “Laws” the president is
obligated (and empowered) to faithfully execute.
This is not a new theory. Before he became our third Chief
Justice, John Marshall served a term as a Federalist Representative to
Congress from Virginia. During the 1800 House debate over the
Jonathan Robbins affair, Marshall argued that President Adams had
been right in surrendering an accused deserter found in South
Carolina to the British pursuant to the extradition provision of the
Jay Treaty without involving the judiciary:
The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. . . .
He possesses the whole Executive power. He holds and directs
the force of the nation. Of consequence, any act to be performed
by the force of the nation is to be performed through him. . . .
The treaty, which is a law, enjoins the performance of a
69.

H.R. REP. NO. 79-1383, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1945)

70.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.

71.

Id. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land . . . .” (emphasis added)). While there has
been some confusion about this phraseology, and some have speculated
that it might have allowed treaties to violate the Constitution, the
actual explanation is that the United States had already entered into
important treaties when the Constitution was written and the Framers
did not wish to create uncertainties about their validity by requiring
that treaties be made only “pursuant” to the Constitution.
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particular object. The person who is to perform this object is
marked out by the Constitution, since the person is named who
conducts the foreign intercourse, and is to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. 72

However, when the 1945 UN Participation Act was being debated
in the Senate, not everyone was anxious to see the president
empowered to order U.S. military forces into combat based upon a
decision by a group of foreigners on the UN Security Council
(although, in fairness, those “foreigners” could not authorize any use
of force over the objection of the American representative to the
Security Council). Isolationist Senator Burton Wheeler (D-Montana)
tried to pull some of the Security Council’s teeth by an amendment to
the UNPA requiring affirmative authorization by the Congress before
U.S. forces could actually be sent into combat to enforce a Security
Council decision. The Wheeler Amendment was very clear in its
purpose:
[T]he President shall have no authority, to make available to
the Security Council any armed forces to enable the Security
Council to take action under article 42 of said charter, unless
the Congress has by appropriate act or joint resolution
authorized the President to make such forces available . . . in
the specific case in which the Council proposed to take action. 73

The Wheeler Amendment was soundly rejected by a bipartisan
margin of greater than seven-to-one, receiving only nine affirmative
votes, 74 and the following year Senator Wheeler could not even get his
party’s nomination to run for reelection.
The unanimous views of the Senate and House foreign affairs
committees in 1945 that no congressional authorization was necessary
for the president to use American military forces to enforce a Security
Council resolution under Chapter VII were fully consistent with the
original understanding of the Constitution. Formal declarations of war
were universally recognized by scholars of the law of nations in the
late eighteenth century to be unnecessary when a nation was using
force defensively, which is precisely the reason the Security Council
authorized the use of force in Korea, Kuwait, and Libya.
There remains the issue of whether the War Powers Resolution
has in any way altered the president’s power to carry out Security
Council Chapter VII resolutions. After all, the Supreme Court has
consistently held treaties and statutes to be of equal dignity, and
72.

10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613–14 (1800).

73.

Turner, Truman, Korea, and the Constitution, supra note 50, at 554
(quoting 91 CONG. REC. 7,989 (1970)).

74.

Id. (quoting 91 CONG. REC. 11,405 (1970)).
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when the two cannot be reconciled the Court gives effect to the most
recent expression of the sovereign will. 75 It follows that if the
pronouncements of the Senate and House committees were but
“interpretations” of authority given to the President by a 1945 treaty,
a 1973 statute like the War Powers Resolution would prevail—
provided that the more recent statute were constitutional. 76
I have already argued that the War Powers Resolution is
unconstitutional, and that the Constitution clearly vested in the
commander-in-chief all military powers not clearly granted to
Congress or the Senate. It seems also clear that the Senate and
House 77 believed they were interpreting the Constitution rather than
merely the Charter, as they referred to the “Constitution under which
the President has well-established powers and obligations to use our
armed forces without specific approval of Congress.” 78
Every administration from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush—
five Republicans and two Democrats—has taken the view that the
War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional. Assuming that is true,
President Obama did not need statutory authorization to participate
in the UN/NATO operation that led to the overthrow and death of
Muammar Qaddafi. However, the situation becomes more complicated
because the Obama Administration has refused to declare the War
Powers Resolution to be unconstitutional. This has placed the
president in a very difficult situation, because if the 1973 statute is
constitutional then the president is clearly guilty of violating the law.
Interestingly, in his June 15, 2012, report to Congress, President
Obama asserted he was reporting not “pursuant to” but merely
“consistent with” 79 the War Powers Resolution—embracing the
language originated during the Ford Administration and used by
every subsequent president to make it clear that by submitting
reports the executive was not acknowledging any legal duty to report
under the unconstitutional statute. The White House report goes on
to explain that the U.S. role had been a limited one, including:

75.

See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).

76.

As Chief Justice John Marshall declared in Marbury, “an act of the
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void . . . .” Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

77.

Note that the House report quoted with approval the earlier Senate
report.

78.

See supra text accompanying note 50.

79.

Letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House,
Presidential Letter—2012 War Powers Resolution 6-Month Report
(June 15, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/06/15/presidential-letter-2012-war-powers-resolution-6month-report.
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(3) since April 23, precision strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles
against a limited set of clearly defined targets in support of the
NATO led coalition’s efforts. . . . With the exception of
operations to rescue the crew of a U.S. aircraft on March 21,
2011 . . . the United States has deployed no ground forces to
Libya.” 80

Congress did not include a definition of “hostilities” in the War
Powers Resolution. Perhaps the best definition to date is from the
very able University of Texas Professor Robert Chesney, who
suggested the test might be “whether U.S. forces have been
authorized to use lethal force other than on a self-defense basis.” 81 But
it is difficult to imagine any definition that is consistent with the clear
spirit and intent of Congress when the statute was enacted that
would permit U.S. military aircraft to fly over the territory of a
foreign nation and fire missiles to kill its soldiers.
Particularly amusing, for some of us who have tilled in this
vineyard for the past four decades, was the testimony to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee by State Department Legal Adviser
Harold Koh—who previously served as Dean of Yale Law School and
for the previous two decades was the strongest academic champion of
the War Powers Resolution. When the Attorney General, White
House Counsel, and Department of Defense General Counsel all
reportedly concluded that legislative authorization was necessary, it
fell to Legal Adviser Koh to defend the Libyan operation. After
quoting statements by predecessors from the Ford and Reagan
Administrations (which he had historically dismissed 82), he told the
Committee: “I continue nearly four decades of dialogue between
Congress and Legal Advisers . . . regarding the Executive Branch’s
legal position on war powers.” 83
Noting that past presidents had largely ignored the War Powers
Resolution, Legal Adviser Koh cautioned the Senators about “narrow
parsing of dictionary definitions” so as “to avoid unduly hampering

80.

Id.

81.

Robert Chesney, Will Congress Amend the WPR by Defining
“Hostilities”?, LAWFARE (June 16, 2011, 12:04 PM), http://www.
lawfareblog.com/2011/06/will-congress-amend-the-wpr-by-defininghostilities/. I highly recommend Lawfare to anyone interested in the
field of national security law.

82.

For a statement of Professor Koh’s views on the War Powers
Resolution, see, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION (1990).

83.

Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 112th Cong. 7, 11 (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh,
Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State).
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future presidents. . . .” 84 He quite correctly noted that “the military
operations that the President anticipated . . . were not sufficiently
extensive . . . to constitute a ‘war’ requiring prior specific approval
under the Declaration of War Clause,” adding: “Scholars will certainly
go on debating this issue. But that should not distract those of us in
government from the most urgent question now facing us which is not
one of law but of policy.” 85
A legal opinion on the Libya operation by the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) reasoned that legislative
authorization was unnecessary, inter alia, because: “[T]he anticipated
operations here served a ‘limited mission’ and did not ‘aim at the
conquest or occupation of territory.’” 86 The memorandum was dated
April 1, 2011, and my first reaction upon reading it was that it must
be an April Fool’s joke. The War Powers Resolution was enacted to
prevent “future Vietnams,” and at no time in Vietnam did U.S. forces
attempt “the conquest or occupation of territory.” Those conditions
are not even arguably implicit in the statutory language.
As someone who spent many years working in both political
branches of government, I take pride that my legal positions have not
shifted either because of the branch that issued my paycheck or the
political party that occupied the White House. In the Senate, I
strongly denounced as unconstitutional the War Powers Resolution,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 87 and the use of
“legislative vetoes” 88 that years later would be declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 89 But I am well familiar with
the old Washington adage that “Where you stand often depends upon
where you sit,” and watching my old friend Harold Koh attempting to
reconcile the administration’s actions in Libya without totally
84.

Id. at 13.

85.

Id. at 17.

86.

Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 11 (2011)
(emphasis added).

87.

For details on my constitutional (and policy) criticism of FISA, see, e.g.,
Congress Too Must “Obey the Law”: Why FISA Must Yield to the
President’s Independent Constitutional Power to Authorize the
Collection of Foreign Intelligence, Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on
the Jud. 109th Cong. 427 (2006) (statement of Robert F. Turner)
[hereinafter Congress Too Must “Obey the Law”]; Is Congress the Real
“Lawbreaker”?: Reconciling FISA with the Constitution, Hearing Before
the H. Jud. Comm. 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Robert F. Turner)
[hereinafter Is Congress the Real “Lawbreaker”?].

88.

For the text of a statement I drafted for Sen. Griffin on this issue in
1976 (seven years before the Chadha decision), see 112 CONG. REC.
17,643–46 (1976).

89.

See INS v. Chadha, 426 U.S. 919 (1983).
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abandoning his historical adulation for the War Powers Resolution
has been more than mildly amusing.

IV. The War Powers Resolution is Unwise
Let me turn now to my final point, that in addition to being
unnecessary and flagrantly unconstitutional, the War Powers
Resolution has done serious harm to the United States and the causes
of world peace and human freedom. There is enough material here for
a good size book, but I shall try to be brief.
To begin with, the War Powers Resolution played at least a small
part in persuading our enemies in Indochina that America had lost its
will to fight and President Nixon (who, to his credit, still hoped to
help protect the millions 90 of non-communists who would later die
when tyranny was allowed to prevail throughout Indochina) was no
longer able to stymie their planned aggression. But, in fairness,
Congress did far more damage six months prior to enactment of the
War Powers Resolution when it enacted legislation prohibiting the
expenditure of appropriated funds for “combat activities” anywhere in
Indochina:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August
15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be
obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat
activities by United States military forces in or over or from off
the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or
Cambodia. 91

Congress clearly had the right to refuse to appropriate new funds
for the war, which might ultimately have produced the same result;
but the Framers of the Constitution unanimously excluded Congress
from any direct role in ending wars (denying it the “power of
peace” 92) and they agreed that any “exceptions” to the president’s
general control of foreign affairs and hostilities were to be “construed
strictly.” 93 In domestic affairs, Congress has great latitude in
proscribing details as to how laws are to be executed. But legislation
that interferes with the ways in which the commander-in-chief
90.

In Cambodia alone, the Yale Cambodia Genocide Program estimated
that approximately 1.7 million people (more than 20% of the country’s
population) died after Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge (“Red Cambodians”)
came to power in 1975. See The CGP 1994-2012, CAMBODIA GENOCIDE
PROG., http://www.yale.edu/cgp/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).

91.

Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, H.R.J. Res. 636, 93rd Cong., § 108,
87 Stat. 132 (1973).

92.

See supra text accompanying note 24.

93.

See supra text accompanying notes 14–16.
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conducts hostilities—e.g., the proposals made by several legislators to
prohibit the “surge” in Iraq (in which the commander-in-chief was
committing reserve forces during an ongoing conflict, a core decision
in the conduct of hostilities)—are inherently suspect. Here, the
president is not executing powers delegated by Congress, but rather
those granted directly to him by the people through the Constitution.
I personally believe this statute to be unconstitutional.
There is a popular belief in Congress and among some scholars
that Congress can achieve its goals by attaching “conditions” to
appropriations bills mandating how the president must act. And in
settings where the president is simply executing authority delegated
by Congress, that is often the case. But this power is limited—like all
grants of constitutional power—to exercises of power that do not
otherwise conflict with the Constitution itself. 94
Thus, when Congress in 1942 sought to attach a bill of attainder
to a military supplemental appropriations act for World War II,
arguing that the “power of the purse” was a plenary power and thus a
“political question” not subject to judicial review, without dissent the
Supreme Court struck it down. 95 The fallacy of this modern view is
easily demonstrated by a hypothetical. If Congress may by
conditional appropriations usurp part of the Commander-in-Chief
Power, by what logic may it not place comparable conditions upon
appropriations for the judiciary—e.g., denying funds if the Supreme
Court overturns (or fails to overturn) a controversial precedent (e.g.,
Row v. Wade 96), or even prohibiting any exercise of the power of
judicial review (which, unlike the Commander-in-Chief Power, is not
expressly enumerated in the Constitution)? For that matter, why
can’t Congress condition judicial appropriations upon the justices of
the Supreme Court appearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee
weekly during their term to receive instructions on how to decide
pending cases? Such a theory would totally destroy the doctrine of

94.

See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936):
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not
alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion
of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress but which, of course, like every other
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the
applicable provisions of the Constitution.
Id. at 319–20 (emphasis added).

95.

United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315–16 (1946).

96.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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separation of powers and leave us with the legislative “tyranny” about
which the Founding Fathers warned us. 97
Returning to the harm done by the War Powers Resolution, one
could make a strong case that it encouraged Soviet adventurism in
places like Angola 98 and Afghanistan 99—and undermined deterrence in

97.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed “the debates of the
Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with
expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National
Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two
branches.” See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976); Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986). Typical of the prevailing view was
Representative James Madison’s remark in 1789 that: “[I]f the federal
Government should lose its proper equilibrium within itself, I am
persuaded that the effect will proceed from the Encroachments of the
Legislative department.” James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra
note 13, at 406.

98.

This is not the occasion for a full discussion of the conflict in Angola.
Summarized briefly, the April 1974 socialist revolution in Portugal led
to the Alvor Agreement in January 1975 in which three rival
revolutionary groups agreed to hold elections to decide the nation’s
future in October. Moscow had been supporting the MPLA (People’s
Movement for the Liberation of Angola) since 1961, and—following the
Communist victories in Indochina—tens of thousands of Cubans were
airlifted to Angola to support the MPLA. The United States began
covertly assisting the two other groups (the FNLA and UNITA) to
“level the playing field,” and on December 9 President Ford met
personally with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to complain of
the intervention. The airlift immediately stopped, but ten days later the
Griffin Amendment (which I had drafted) was defeated, and the Senate
quickly approved the Clark Amendment cutting off all CIA assistance to
the non-Communist forces in Angola. The airlift immediately resumed.
Estimates of the number of people who subsequently died in Angola
before Congress repealed the Clark Amendment in 1985 range as high as
1.5 million. See, e.g., Bethany Lacina & Nils Petter Gleditsch,
Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths,
21 EURO. J. POPULATION 145, 159 (2005).

99.

President Carter’s failure to understand the nature of Leninism likely
played a significant role in undermining deterrence in this setting, but
the fact that Congress had enacted legislation preventing him from
responding to international aggression was almost certainly a factor. In
June 1977, President Carter declared in a commencement address at
Notre Dame University that America was finally free of its “inordinate
fear of communism. . . .” See President Jimmy Carter, Human Rights
and Foreign Policy, Commencement Remarks at Notre Dame University
(June 1977), available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/
index.asp?document=727. To his credit, President Carter became more
aware of the Leninist threat following the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. In his final weeks in office, President Carter began
providing covert assistance to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and
military aid to the government of El Salvador as well. For a useful
summary of why resisting Communist aggression was important, see
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Central America 100 as well—but, for reasons of space, I want to focus
on the deployment of peacekeepers in Beirut, Lebanon three decades
ago.
As some will remember, in 1982 President Reagan sent a
contingent of Marines to join peacekeepers from Great Britain,
France, and Italy in what might be described as a “presence”
mission. 101 The goal was simply to keep things peaceful and provide
assurance to the representatives of the various rival factions in
Lebanon that they could come together to try to negotiate a peace
agreement without fear of being killed. Every country in the region
and every faction in Beirut initially supported the mission. Further,
the Chief Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dr.
Fred Tipson, told me personally that he had never seen better
consultation from the White House on a military deployment.
Not a single member of Congress objected to the deployment,
although several recognized that there were some risks associated with
sending U.S. forces into the region. Violence was not uncommon in
either the Middle East or in Beirut at the time. But most observers
seemed to think that the mission was warranted by the chance of
bringing peace to Lebanon.
If we apply Professor Chesney’s definition of “hostilities,” 102 it is
useful to note that the Rules of Engagement for the Marines were
that they could “only return rather than initiate fire” and use force
“only in self-defense.” 103 The deployment had nothing to do with the
power of Congress to “declare War.”
Nevertheless, “consistent with” the War Powers Resolution,
President Reagan submitted a report to Congress explaining the
mission. But some congressional Democrats 104 apparently saw political
JEAN-LOUIS PANNÉ ET AL., THE BLACK BOOK
TERROR REPRESSION (1999).

OF

COMMUNISM: CRIMES,

100. For background on the conflict in Central America, see ROBERT F.
TURNER, NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES: A LOOK AT THE FACTS (1986);
Robert F. Turner, Peace and the World Court: A Comment on the
Paramilitary Activities Case, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 53, 56–69
(1987); and JOHN NORTON MOORE, THE SECRET WAR IN CENTRAL
AMERICA (1987).
101. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at 16.
102. See Chesney, supra note 81.
103. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, supra note 5, at
139 (citing S. REP. 98-242, 129 CONG. REC. 12914 (1983)).
104. This is not in my view a partisan issue. A look at some of the remarks
made by Republican leaders during the 2011 Libya operation reveals
that neither political party has much interest in Senator Arthur
Vanderberg’s principle that “politics should stop at the water’s edge”
when the White House is controlled by the other party. Arthur
Vandenberg: A Featured Biography, SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE,
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hay to be made if they could portray the deployment as “another
Vietnam,” and House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Clement
Zablocki took public exception to the fact that President Reagan had
not reported specifically under Section 4(a)(1), as required when a
president sends U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances. . . .” 105 Zablocki declared that the president’s failure to
report under Section 4(a)(1) was “eroding the integrity of the law”
and threatening a “constitutional crisis.” 106 (One can only wonder how
the various militia groups in Beirut would have responded to learning
that President Reagan had informed Congress he was sending U.S.
Marines into “hostilities” when they had been assured the
multinational force intended only to engage in “peacekeeping.”
Certainly such a message would not have contributed to the goal of
reassuring the armed factions that they could safely engage in
peaceful negotiations.)
Particularly in the Senate, the debate soon took on an even more
partisan tone. The Washington Post noted that “the fairly prominent
involvement of Senate Democratic Campaign Chairman Lloyd
Bentsen in the dispute . . . suggest[s] that the Democrats are doing
push-ups for 1984.” 107 Although the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has historically prided itself for a tradition of nonpartisanship, when its report on the Beirut deployment legislation was
released it included a section entitled “Minority Views of All
Democratic Committee Members” 108—which from my five years of
experience working with that committee was uncommon if not
unprecedented.
During the hearings leading up to that report, Marine Corps
Commandant General P.X. Kelley cautioned the Senators that their
partisan debate was endangering the lives of his Marines. As
summarized in the Committee Report:
Marine Corps Commandant Paul X. Kelley testified to the
Committee on September 13 that a short time limit might
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Feature
d_Bio_Vandenberg.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
105. For details on this deployment and relevant citations for this section of
my paper, see TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION,
supra note 5, at 138–44.
106. Clement Zablocki, Reagan is Skirting the War Powers Resolution,
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1982, at B7.
107. Helen Dewar, Senate Democrats Dig in Their Heals, WASH. POST, Sept.
18, 1983, at A1.
108. 129 CONG. REC. S12929 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen.
Biden).
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stimulate more attacks on the Marines in an effort to encourage
a public outcry for the withdrawal. He commented that “I am
concerned that we could impose what could prove to be a
dangerous time constraint that would be misread by our
potential adversaries. . . . It would encourage hostile forces or
forces inimical to the best interest, the life and limb of the
Marines.” 109

Soon thereafter, when an unidentified White House spokesman
made the same point, Senate Democrats went ballistic. As reported in
the Washington Post, Senator Thomas Eagleton “blasted back
angrily” that “[t]o suggest . . . that congressional insistence that the
law be lived up to is somehow giving aid and comfort to the enemy is
totally unacceptable.” The Post observed: “When the anonymous
White House comment implying danger for the Marines was reported
on Capitol Hill, Democratic leaders were infuriated and, if anything,
hardened their position.” 110
During the highly partisan Senate floor debate on a joint
resolution to extend the deployment another eighteen months,
Senator Joe Biden (D-Delaware) made reference to the fears expressed
by some that even having the debate might be endangering the lives
of the Marines in Beirut:
[Y]ou have already heard the argument—“what will happen is
that those who wish to see the marines leave and spoil things
for Lebanon will in fact continue the pressure upon the United
States of America by shelling the marines, building up support
in America to bring the boys home”. . . . My response to that is
that may be true, but until we once invoke the War Powers Act
. . . . we are going to always be in the situation where we are
beaten over the head by every administration that says 60 days
is not enough time. 111

The joint resolution passed the Senate by the narrow margin of 54
to 46—a shift in four votes could have denied the president
authority—with only two Democrats breaking ranks and supporting
President Reagan. 112 Immediately after the vote, Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Charles Percy (R-Illinois) assured his Senate
colleagues that “we are not simply dropping out of the picture” until
the eighteen-month extension expired, and “we will follow the
situation carefully,” emphasizing that the authorization could be
109. Id. at S12913.
110. T.R. Reid & Juan Williams, White House, Hill Battle Over War Powers
Act, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1983, at A1.
111. 129 CONG. REC. S12925 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983).
112. 129 CONG. REC. S13167 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
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amended “if the circumstances should justify it.” 113 In case America’s
adversaries missed that subtle message, the Christian Science Monitor
had already put it more bluntly: “Congressional hesitation,
reservations, and fears are such, however, that should American
troops suffer casualties in Beirut, many senators and congressmen
would immediately reconsider their support.” 114
The message was clearly not missed by the forces of radical Islam
in the Middle East, and soon after the highly-partisan congressional
debates, American intelligence intercepted a message between two
Muslim militia units: “If we kill 15 Marines, the rest will leave.”115
This intelligence intercept was apparently leaked to the news media,
as it was quoted in the U.S. News & World Report that hit the
streets on Monday, October 24, 1983. 116 The day before, at 6:22 AM a
terrorist truck bomb had claimed the lives of 241 sleeping Marine
peacekeepers in Beirut. The truck bomb was estimated by the FBI to
have been more powerful than 12,000 pounds of TNT—the largest
non-nuclear, man-made explosion since World War II. 117
One might ask why the Marines were attacked. Traditionally,
anyone considering attacking U.S. Marines would realize that, soon
thereafter, a large contingent of other Marines with very bad attitudes
would descend upon them and impose a painful lesson—not
something any rational person would wish. But, starting with
Vietnam, Congress changed the rules—in the process flagrantly
disregarding the oath of office taken by each member to support the
Constitution. And in Beirut, Congress unintentionally placed a virtual
bounty on the lives of American Marines, assuring our enemies that if
they could kill enough Marines, Congress would likely “reconsider”
the deployment, and enough votes would be changed to require the
prompt withdrawal of the survivors. This certainly wasn’t intentional,
but at the same time the Senators had been expressly warned by the
Commandant of the Marine Corps that their partisan debate was
placing his Marines at risk.
113. 129 CONG. REC. S12920 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen.
Percy).
114. John Knickerbocker & Daniel Southerland, Congress: A Wary “Aye” on
Marines, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 22, 1983, at 1.
115. Marines Draw a Bead on Snipers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP’T, Oct. 31,
1983, at 13.
116. This periodical is always dated one week after it is released, presumably
so potential purchasers will view it as still current news. To allow for
printing and distribution, it would certainly have been finalized prior to
the bombing of the Marine barracks the previous morning.
117. Rick Hampson, 25 Years Later, Bombing in Beirut Still Resonates, USA
TODAY Oct. 15, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/200810-15-beirut-barracks_N.htm.

136

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
The War Powers Resolution at 40

Soon thereafter, the remaining Marines were withdrawn. But
that’s not the end of the story. In 1998, Osama bin Laden told an
ABC News reporter in Afghanistan: “We have seen in the last decade
the decline of American power and the weakness of the American
Soldier, who is ready to wage Cold Wars, but unprepared to fight
long wars. This was proven in Beirut in 1983 when the Marines fled
after two explosions.” 118 It does not take a rocket scientist to
recognize that the partisan and unconstitutional 1983 congressional
debates pursuant to the War Powers Resolution on the Beirut
deployment played a major role in persuading Osama bin Laden to
launch the 9/11 attacks eighteen years later.
In fairness, the Beirut congressional debates were not the only
factor. Time will not permit a detailed discussion of the role of
Congress in undermining U.S. humanitarian efforts to save hundreds
of thousands of lives in Somalia in 1991 to 1993, for example. But
when Major General Thomas Montgomery requested Abrams tanks
for force protection, “[t]he Clinton team, under mounting
congressional pressure to withdraw all U.S. forces, blocked this
recommendation.” 119 Soon thereafter, on the night of October 3–4,
118. Robert T. Jordan, Courage in the Face of Terror, NAVAL HIST. MAG.
(Oct. 2008), http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2008-10/cou
rage-face-terror. See also Scott Dodd & Peter Smolowitz, 1983 Beirut
Bomb Began Era of Terror, DESERET NEWS Oct. 20 2003, http://
www.deseretnews.com/article/515039782/1983-Beirut-bomb-began-eraof-terror.html?pg=all; Peter Arnett, Transcript of Osama Bin Ladin
Interview, http://www.anusha.com/osamaint.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2013). Bin Laden said:
After a little resistance, The American troops left after achieving
nothing. They left after claiming that they were the largest
power on earth. They left after some resistance from powerless,
poor, unarmed people whose only weapon is the belief in Allah
The Almighty, and who do not fear the fabricated American
media lies. We learned from those who fought there, that they
were surprised to see the low spiritual morale of the American
fighters in comparison with the experience they had with the
Russian fighters. The Americans ran away from those fighters
who fought and killed them, while the latter were still there. If
the U.S. still thinks and brags that it still has this kind of power
even after all these successive defeats in Vietnam, Beirut, Aden,
and Somalia, then let them go back to those who are awaiting
its return.
Id.
119. THE ART OF COMMAND: MILITARY LEADERSHIP FROM GEORGE
WASHINGTON TO COLIN POWELL 260 (Harry S. Laver & Jeffrey J.
Matthews eds., 2008) (emphasis added); see also Lt. Col. Kevin H.
Winters, U.S. Army War College, Access to the President by Combatant
Commanders 9–10 (1999), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA363928. A useful time-line of events in
Somalia can be found at Ambush in Mogadishu, PBS, http://www.pbs.
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1993, eighteen American rangers were killed and eighty-four others
wounded in an event later portrayed in the 2001 movie Blackhawk
Down—a tragedy that might easily have been prevented by the use of
the denied Abrams tanks. The subsequent withdrawal of U.S. forces
provided further evidence to bin Laden that Americans had no
stomach for casualties. 120
This leads me to my final point. The War Powers Resolution is
hardly the only unconstitutional statute enacted by Congress in the
wake of Vietnam that has done serious harm to our nation and the
cause of peace. Indeed, having played a prominent role via the War
Powers Resolution in providing the incentives that led bin Laden to
attack America on 9/11, a separate statute usurped the president’s
constitutional power over what John Jay in Federalist No. 64 referred
to as “the business of intelligence” 121—preventing our intelligence
community from discovering and preventing the plots that killed
nearly 3,000 Americans on September 11, 2001. I am talking, of
course, about the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
From 1981 to 1984, I worked in the White House as counsel to
the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board. One of my duties was to
ensure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security
Agency, and other elements of the intelligence community complied
with laws (and Executive Orders) constraining intelligence activities—
one of the most important of which being the FISA statute. Now is
not the time for a detailed discussion of this statute, but it makes it a
felony for anyone within the intelligence community to engage in
electronic surveillance within the United States unless he or she first
obtains a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court—
and to obtain such a warrant he or she must satisfy the court that the
target of the surveillance is a “foreign power” or agent thereof. The
term “foreign power” is defined so as to include international terrorist
organizations like al-Qaeda.
To their credit, FBI agents in San Diego identified two of the men
who later hijacked American Airlines Flight 77 that crashed into the
Pentagon on 9/11 as potential terrorists, but they had no evidence to
tie them to al-Qaeda and were instructed to back off out of fear even
a visual surveillance in public might lead to civil liberties complaints.
Similarly, FBI agents in Minneapolis learned that Zacarias
Moussaoui was taking lessons to learn how to pilot large commercial
jet aircraft, and they became convinced he was a foreign terrorist who
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/etc/cron.html (last visited
Feb. 21, 2013); see also ROBERT PATTERSON, RECKLESS DISREGARD 112–
13 (2004).
120. See 129 CONG. REC. S12926 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen.
Biden).
121. See infra text accompanying notes 130–31.
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intended to use a hijacked plane as a weapon. Repeatedly, they
sought assistance from the National Security Law Unit of the FBI’s
Washington, D.C., headquarters; but they were told (correctly) that
without evidence Moussaoui was an “agent of a foreign power” such a
warrant could not be obtained. 122 After the 9/11 attacks, Coleen
Rowley—the chief legal adviser to the Minneapolis FBI office—wrote
a scathing memorandum to FBI Director Robert Mueller complaining
about the incompetence of the bureaucrats at FBI headquarters—
which along with congressional testimony to the same effect resulted
in her being named one of three “whistleblowers” in Time magazine’s
“Persons of the Year” in 2002. 123
In reality, the lawyers in the National Security Law Unit did
exactly what the statute required and patiently explained to Ms.
Rowley that if she could not find information linking Moussaoui to a
foreign power she might try to obtain a criminal warrant through the
local U.S. Attorney. But Ms. Rowley believed the U.S. Attorney’s
office in Minneapolis was too strict in its requirements for probable
cause, and did not pursue that avenue 124—a decision she later
admitted she regretted. 125 Ultimately, there was a major investigation
by the Department of Justice Inspector General’s Office, and in their
(declassified in 2006) report of more than 400 pages the inspectors
emphasized Ms. Rowley’s ignorance of the FISA statute. 126
This same Inspector General report revealed what may be another
consequence of the congressional assault of presidential powers
following the Vietnam War. Specifically, a strong case can be made
that the reason America could not get the information necessary to
sustain a FISA warrant for Moussaoui is because one of our most
important foreign allies did not believe we could be trusted with
extremely sensitive intelligence information.
The report notes that the FBI had made repeated inquires both in
writing and by phone of the British government seeking any
information it might have tying Moussaoui to al-Qaeda or any other
“foreign power.” 127 Although it was emphasized that the request was
extremely urgent, weeks went by with no response. The day after the
122. U. S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. of the Inspector Gen., A Review of the FBI’s
Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11
Attacks 141–43 (Nov. 2004) (publicly released June 2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0606/final.pdf.
123. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of The Year 2002: The
Whistleblowers, TIME (Dec. 30, 2002), http://www.time.com/time/mag
azine/article/0,9171,1003998,00.html.
124. U. S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 122, at 130–31, 140.
125. Id. at 140.
126. See, e.g., id. at 190 n.146.
127. Id. at 101, 121, 151.
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attacks of September 11, 2001, killed thousands of Americans, the
British provided the FBI with information that Moussaoui had
attended an al-Qaeda training camp 128—information that might
theoretically have allowed the FBI to obtain a FISA warrant to
search Moussaoui’s laptop and collect other information that might
have prevented the attacks. (I say “theoretically,” because FISA
warrants require considerable documentation and layers of high-level
approval, and in 2001 usually took weeks if not months to obtain once
the necessary evidence of a tie to a “foreign power” like al-Qaeda had
been established. So even if the British had been more cooperative,
the request for a warrant might well have still been tied up in
procedural delay when the attacks occurred. The entire fiasco
reaffirms the brilliance of the Founding Fathers, who repeatedly
emphasized the need for “speed and dispatch” in military and
diplomatic matters.)
The Inspector General report concluded: “It is not clear why the
information from the British was not provided to the FBI until after
September 11.” 129 One possible explanation that comes readily to
mind is that the source of the British intelligence might have been
extremely sensitive—someone providing information of the greatest
importance who might be killed if such information became public,
and the United States could not be relied upon to keep secrets. While
classified information is leaked by members of both political branches,
the access given to legislators and their staff starting in the mid-1970s
has been a source of particular concern to foreign intelligence services
that have traditionally been cooperative with the United States. And
while I deplore the delay that might possibly have prevented the 9/11
attacks, I can’t honestly say that I blame the British for wishing to
protect their sources and methods.
If fear of American “leaks” was in reality the reason the British
withheld the information on Moussaoui, it was hardly a new concern.
Writing in Federalist No. 64 in 1788, John Jay had explained that the
reason the Congress had been excluded from any role in “the business
of intelligence” was because their members could not be trusted to
keep secrets130 and foreign intelligence sources would be unwilling to

128. Id. at 180.
129. Id.
130. In 1776, when the Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Second
Continental Congress learned through secret agents that France had
agreed to provide major assistance to aid the new nation in its war for
independence against Great Britain, Benjamin Franklin and the other
four members of the Committee unanimously concluded that they could
not share the information with anyone else in Congress, adding in their
secret report: “We find by fatal experience that Congress consists of too
many members to keep secrets.” Verbal Statement of Thomas Story to
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share sensitive information if they knew it would be shared with
legislators:
These are cases where the most useful intelligence may be
obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from
apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on
those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or
friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both
descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the President,
but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in
that of a large popular Assembly. The convention have done
well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties,
that although the President must, in forming, them act by the
advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage
the business of intelligence in such manner as prudence may
suggest. 131

I have charged that FISA was unconstitutional, and a brief
summary of the reasons for that conclusion may be in order before
bringing this piece to a close. I worked in the Senate when FISA was
enacted in 1978 and I believed it to be unconstitutional at the time. I
have testified before both the Senate 132 and House 133 Judiciary
committees on the statute at some length since the 9/11 attacks, but
space will not permit a lengthy discussion of its infirmities here. I will
note that every federal court to decide the issue has held that there is
a “national security” or “foreign intelligence” exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement, and when the 1980 Truong
case, 134 reaching that same conclusion, was appealed to the Supreme
Court, not a single justice voted to grant certiorari. 135 Indeed, even
Congress recognized the president’s independent constitutional power
to collect “foreign intelligence information” when it wrote the first

the Committee, in 2 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
THE NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES 819 (Peter Force ed., 1837–1853).
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131. FEDERALIST No. 64, at 434–35 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961) (emphasis
added).
132. See Congress Too Must “Obey the Law,” supra note 87.
133. See Is Congress the Real “Lawbreaker”?, supra note 87.
134. United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 912 (4th Cir. 1980). The court
held that “separation of powers requires us to acknowledge the principal
responsibility of the President for foreign affairs and concomitantly for
foreign intelligence surveillance.” Id. at 914.
135. The Court usually does not grant certiorari when all of the circuits are
in accord, but surely if the justices had believed that the government
was violating fundamental principles of the Bill of Rights at least one of
them would have made that known.
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federal wiretap law in 1968, 136 and the appellate court established by
the FISA statute unanimously noted in 2002:
The Truong court, as did all the other courts to have decided
the issue, held that the President did have inherent authority to
conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence
information. . . . We take for granted that the President does
have that authority and, assuming that is so, FISA could not
encroach on the President’s constitutional power. 137

Those interested in a more detailed discussion of the issue are
invited to examine my extensive congressional testimony on the
issue. 138
Speaking at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., on
January 23, 2006, the Director of the National Security Agency from
1999 to 2005 discussed the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP)
authorized by President Bush shortly after the 9/11 attacks and
declared: “Had this program been in effect prior to 9/11, it is my
professional judgment that we would have detected some of the 9/11
al Qaeda operatives in the United States, and we would have
identified them as such.” 139 From working with the Intelligence
Community over many decades, and private conversations with
friends in the business both from this country and abroad, I don’t
think there is any doubt about that.

V. Conclusion
In conclusion, the 1973 War Powers Resolution is a horrible law.
It is without the slightest doubt unconstitutional—not just in specific
terms like the legislative veto in Section 5(c), but at its very core. Nor
does it serve any serious purpose, because it was premised upon the
136. “Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile
acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect
national security information against foreign intelligence activities.”
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970)
(emphasis added).
137. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev.
2002) (emphasis added).
138. See Congress Too Must “Obey the Law,” supra note 87; Is Congress the
Real “Lawbreaker”?, supra note 87.
139. Michael V. Hayden, Principal Deputy Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Address
to the National Press Club: What American Intelligence & Especially
the NSA Have Been Doing to Defend the Nation (Jan. 23 2006),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2006/01/hayden012306.html.
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falsehood that “imperial presidents” took America to war in Korea
and Vietnam without consulting Congress, when the facts clearly
show that President Truman was talked out of seeking an AUMF in
Korea and the Indochina War (not only in South Vietnam, but in
Cambodia as well) was formally authorized with the affirmative votes
of 99.6% of the members of Congress.
Finally, I submit that the evidence shows that partisan debates
over the War Powers Resolution—and the military disasters they
produced—were a primary factor in Osama bin Laden’s decision to
launch the 9/11 attacks, and another post-Vietnam unconstitutional
statute (FISA) prevented our intelligence community from detecting
and preventing those attacks.
The time has come to demand—as the bipartisan National War
Powers Commission unanimously recommended four years ago—that
Congress repeal the 1973 War Powers Resolution. Forty years of
congressional law-breaking is long enough.

143

